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Abstract This chapter begins by looking at the causes of internal conflict in devel-
oping countries, reviewing the rational choice debate between greed and grievance
as a cause of conflict. It argues that these explanations may be complementary, and
the breakdown of the institutions behind conflict resolution, or the social contract,
may explain why large scale internal conflict breaks out. It looks at the relationship
between globalisation and conflict, bearing in mind that civil war is only one form of
violent organised internal conflict, and the fact that the relationship between economic
progress, and the risk of conflict may be non-linear, with both growth and the absence
of growth producing conflict risk. It then closely examines the relationship between
natural resource endowment and conflict risk, arguing that economic dependence on
certain types of resources and its associated weak institutions are more likely to pro-
duce conflict. The growing prevalence of sectarian and civilisational conflict is also
outlined, along with the argument for a need for studying conflict at a more local,
sub-national level of analysis.
Keywords Internal conflict, civil war, social contract, globalisation and conflict,
natural resources and conflict.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Even an idealist philosopher like Immanuel Kant (1795) considered war to be the nat-
ural state of man. In that respect, he shared the perspective of the English philosopher
Thomas Hobbes (1651). According to Hobbes, the state of nature was characterised
by anarchy akin to perpetual war. Life was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’’
(Hobbes 1651: 84). Consequently, self-interest dictated that individuals should relin-
quish their personal freedom to an absolute ruler who could ensure personal security
and rule based interactions in society. Kant was concerned more with the prevention of
war between nations. That would require the simultaneous adoption of a republican
constitution by all nations, which inter alia would check the war-like tendencies of
both monarchs and the citizenry; the cosmopolitanism that would emerge among the
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comity of nations would preclude war, implying a confederation amongst such nation
states (foedus pacificum). Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism is also applicable within
nation states. Both thinkers were concerned with mechanisms that would engender
peace. In other words, peace has to be achieved through deliberate design; this is what
Galtung (1964) described as the negative peace (the absence of war).
Within nation states, civil war is only one manifestation of large-scale violent
conflict. It is important to emphasise that civil ‘war’ involves the direct participation
of the state and military style confrontations. Since the end of the cold war, conflict
research has been dominated by the study of civil war in developing countries and in
the former Soviet bloc. One of the factors that contribute to the gestation of many
of these civil wars is natural resources, an issue that becomes central to the causation
of civil wars in a variety of guises. These include the violent contestation of valuable
natural resource rents, normally restricted to minerals, fuels and narcotic substances.
The loss of local control over resource rents and resource use (to central government
and the forces of globalisation) is often an important source of the grievances that
breed conflict. Also, population growth and climate change can induce neo-Malthusian
factors leading to the scarcity of land, forests and water resources for agriculture,
forestry or pastoral activities may ignite internal conflict (Homer-Dixon 1999).
The discourse on the nature of civil war has gradually evolved into a discussion
of development or state failure, depending upon the disciplinary or political stance of
the interlocutors. Coinciding with this, there has been a growing proclivity on the part
of Western governments and international organisations to become directly involved
in conflict affected developing countries after the demise of the cold war, and the
associated undermining of Westphalian state sovereignty.
The number of armed conflicts peaked in 1991, when 52 wars occurred in 38
countries. By 2007, however, this number had declined to 34 wars in 25 countries
(Gleditsch 2008). Likewise, associated conflict fatalities are also declining. There is
one caveat, the number of Muslim countries experiencing civil war as a proportion of
all countries in civil war is rising. Civil (and inter-state) war incidence is on the wane,
but other forms of violent conflict may be rising, and these do not always involve the
state as a direct participant.
For example, violence associated with democratic transitions in many parts of the
developing world is still rife. It has been found that the risk of conflict is higher during
transitions from an autocratic to a democratic system and vice versa than in long-
standing and established autocracies or democracies (Hegre et al. 2001). Although
there has been a marked shift towards democracy in most developing countries since
the end of the cold war, andmost have adopted themulti-party electoral system to form
governments, they still lack adequate constraints on the executive and their electoral
systems are fraughtwith imperfections. Wemight, therefore, better describe these states
as anocracies as opposed to democracies. An anocracy has characteristics of both
democracy and autocracy; most developing countries fall into this category, raising
conflict risk, as will be seen from the discussion below.
Secondly, the losers of increased globalisation, which widens the gulf between the
‘haves and have nots’, sometimes transform their protests into violent insurgencies.
Rapid globalisation, especially in the form of increased international trade and inward
foreign investment has increased income differences between skilled and unskilled
workers all over the world (Mamoon and Murshed 2008), and income inequality
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generally (Milanovic 2011). In many developing societies, rural hinterlands have been
particularly disadvantaged; where it is combined with ethnic differences with the
majority of the state’s population, this relative backwardness can constitute a recipe for
violent (Maoist style) insurgencies. Recent increases in food and fuel prices, coupled
with real resources devoted to debt servicing present new vulnerabilities. The important
point is that such relative deprivation can take place even when the nation’s aggre-
gate economic performance is impressive and growth is both positive and buoyant.
Thirdly, there are ethnic or communal conflicts where groups compete over dwindling
resources, such as those utilised in agriculture (Homer-Dixon 1999) or other con-
testable endowments like land. Many of these ethnic conflicts do not include the state
as a direct participant.
Contemporary violent internal conflict does not always take the form of civil war;
it can be associated with both developmental success and failure, the more acute form
of the latter is often referred to as state failure. Mass protest and communal strife are
becoming increasingly important forms of internal conflicts in developing countries.
Thus, even in successful developing countries and emerging market economies such
as India, globalisation and growth can lead to new forms of conflict. Furthermore,
democracy does not serve as a panacea for conflict prevention.
This chapter summarises the state of the art on the origins of violent internal
conflict in developing countries, highlighting the connection with natural resources.
The rest of this work is organised as follows. Section 2 contains an outline of new
forms of vulnerability and an integrated theory of conflict and development. Section
3 presents a sketch of the relationships between natural resources and conflict or
cooperation. The salience of the local nature of new types of conflict is described
in section 4, while section 5 outlines issues in sectarian (communal) conflict based on
ethnic difference. Finally, section 6 is by way of conclusion, pointing to certain lacunae
in conflict research.
3.2 CONFLICT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT/DEVELOPMENT
Nowadays, organised large-scale conflict in developing countries is almost universally
regarded as a source of human development failure, the perpetuation of poverty and
human insecurity, all of which enhance the risk of failed states. Equally, endemic
poverty and state failure enhance the risk of civil war and conflict. Therefore, the
developmental goal of poverty reduction requires conflict prevention. Conflict (even
in distant lands) further undermines international security, and thus conflict preven-
tion, abatement and resolution are paramount if the costs of dealing with state failure
are to be avoided. Following on, both developmental and security considerations neces-
sitate conflict prevention via human development and poverty reduction. In practice,
however, it is difficult to separate the development and security agendas. In 1941,
during the Second World War, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt proclaimed four
fundamental freedoms. Among these were the freedom from want and the freedom
from fear. The former may be regarded as akin to human development. When we
combine it with the freedom from fear it helps shape our notion of human security.
Once again, these two freedoms are inextricably intertwined, because without security,
ensuring livelihoods is meaningless. Likewise, the converse is equally true. In policy
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terms, for example, the reduction of absolute poverty, connected with the millennium
development goals (MDGs), yields a double dividend by simultaneously addressing
security and developmental concerns.
In the past three decades, and particularly since the end of the cold war, there
appears to be a greater incidence of developmental failure and, in the extreme form,
state failure, which sometimes leads to violent conflict. Related to these phenomena
are the functions of the state. Is the state benevolent or predatory? A great deal has
been written on this, but what is salient is that we are increasingly regarding the innate
nature of the state in developing countries as factional or predatory. We seem to have
left behind the idea that the state should be a functionary agent of society. Even within
the predatory category, there are shades of grey associated with good, moderate or
bad governance. In many ways, these distinctions among states mirror Olson’s (1996)
stationary and roving bandit dichotomy. A stationary bandit (state) nurtures the tax
base (society) so that more can be extracted in the future, while a roving bandit is only
bent on what can be extorted here and now.
3.2.1 Causes of conflict risk
One robust result in the empirical cross-country civil war literature is that per-capita
income and conflict risk are significantly and negatively correlated. Although this
finding may disguise the mechanisms that truly underlie the statistical association,
conflict risk is heavily associated with developmental and state failure. My contention
is that both development failure and rapid development (or growth) enhance conflict
risk. Additionally, factors external to the nation state can also enhance conflict risk.
Within the rational choice literature on conflict, two broad factors, greed and
grievance, have been closely linked to the recent (post-cold war) onset of civil war (see
Chapters 3 and 5 in Murshed 2010 for a lengthier elaboration of the arguments that
follow in this sub-section). If we were to summarise the greed argument in Collier and
Hoeffler (2004), conflict reflects elite competition over valuable natural resource rents,
often concealed under the fig leaf of collective grievance. Economic, political and social
inequalities play an insignificant role in this process, as these types of grievances are
omnipresent in any society. Rather, it is the opportunity afforded by natural resource
rents as a ready source of finance for war that is crucial to these forms of violent dispu-
tation. There is also a poverty trap in this connection: poverty makes soldiering a less
unattractive livelihood strategy, lowering the opportunity cost of war in poor nations.
In turn, conflict serves to perpetuate poverty, because of war’s destructiveness and
a vicious cycle of poverty-conflict-poverty ensues (see, for example, Paul Collier and
associates for theWorld Bank 2003). Fearon and Laitin (2003) assert that civil war risk
is mainly associated with diminished state capacity to either deter violent challenges to
the state or assuage underlying grievances through transfers and government expen-
diture. This finding, taken together with Paul Collier’s work, has a simple intuitive
appeal: civil wars occur in poverty stricken, failed states characterised by venal, cor-
rupt and inept regimes, where the dynamics of war are sustained by a motivation akin
to banditry. It also provides the intellectual basis for direct, colonial style intervention
in collapsed or failing states.
Against this is a long-standing view that relative deprivation (Gurr 1970) and the
grievance that it produces fuels internal violence, although the original argument of
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Ted Gurr pertained more to individual motivation rather than group dynamics. Iden-
tity is also crucial to intra-state conflict. Group dynamics require the resolution of
the collective action problem, as discussed in Olson (1965). In order to mobilise large
groups to undertake collective action and fight other groups, intra-group mistrust,
monitoring difficulties and the free-rider problems have to be overcome. Ethnic identi-
ties, whether based on race, language, religion, tribal affiliation or regional differences,
may serve as a more effective amalgam for the purposes of group formation compared
to other forms of difference based on individual inequality such as socioeconomic class.
No conflict can proceed without the presence of palpably perceived group differences
or grievances, which may have historical dimensions. Frances Stewart (2000) coined
the phrase horizontal inequality, the inequality between groups, rather than individ-
ual inequality within otherwise homogenous populations (vertical inequality). Crucial
here are the more enduring (or hard to change) dimensions of inequality (Tilly 1998),
and inequality of opportunity, compared to relatively more transient causes of inequal-
ity (like current income), such as the manner in which certain groups are discriminated
against, simply because of their ethnic characteristics, as opposed to other personal
attributes.
3.2.2 Social contract
Ultimately, the greed and grievance motivations for conflict may actually be insep-
arable. Even if one theory is better at motivating the start of conflict, the other
phenomenon is sure to follow. Thus, it is not uncommon for a conflict linked to
palpable grievances, for example, to mutate into a situation where the rebels become
greedy, and both greed and grievance can be seen to co-exist. It appears that the greed
explanation for conflict duration and secessionist wars performs well, in terms of sta-
tistical significance, in cross-country studies, but has to make way for grievance-based
arguments in country-case studies, even in quantitative analyses. Grievances and hor-
izontal inequalities may, after all, be better at explaining why conflicts begin, but not
necessarily why they persist because conflicts require finance, and without internal
mechanisms of war finance conflicts may be quickly ended by external intervention
(unless the external intervention backs one side in a civil war). Although the presence
of either greed or grievance is necessary for the outbreak of violent conflict, they are
not sufficient. This requires institutional breakdown for peaceful conflict resolution,
which may be described as the failure of the social contract (Murshed 2010). The
remainder of this sub-section summarises the arguments therein.
The social contract refers to the mechanisms within society that resolve conflict
without outright violence. It contains a moral, economic and political component both
at national and local levels. It also implies a functional view of the state: governments
exist to serve a purpose, and rule is by consent. Contemporary civil wars are more
often related to the breakdown of explicit or implicit mechanisms to share power and
resources, rather than the complete absence of an agreement to govern these. This
is true even in the most extreme cases of so called state failure, such as in Somalia.
Cold war rivalries and the interventions of external powers in the domestic affairs of
other countries may also undermine an existing social contract. Among the various
factors, two domestic reasons leading to the decline of the social contract deserve
special mention.
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The first point refers to the resource sharing agreements. In a well ordered society,
some understanding usually exists about sharing revenues and/or expenditure between
those in power and others not in power; the breakdown of these arrangements or
the undermining of the credibility of existing commitments to resource sharing can
produce greed and/or grievance. There are many examples of conflicts that emerge out
of fiscal disputes, something that can be exacerbated in the context of economic decline.
Disputes over the apportionment of revenues from natural resources are especially
common and, as in Nigeria and Indonesia, these often take on ethnic and regional
dimensions. Additionally, the social contract is less likely to hold when ruling regimes
prefer repression to making transfers that assuage rebellion.
Secondly, there is the political system. Hegre et al. (2001) point out that the risk of
conflict is lower in both well-established democracies and autocracies. This suggests
that conflict risk is at its greatest during transitions to and away from democracy, when
state capacity is weak, and also in fledgling and imperfect democracies (anocracies).
State capacity (its ability to both police citizens and provide public goods) is greater
in established autocratic or democratic societies, rather than in those somewhere in
the middle. Thus, there may be an inverted u-shaped relation between democracy
and internal conflict: increased democracy is first associated with rising violence, after
a critical point in democratic achievement, conflict and violence diminish. In other
words, democratic transitions may induce a greater risk of violence, unless managed
well via systems of power sharing and constraints on the executive.
The activities of the state are important in maintaining the cohesiveness of society,
which relates to a functioning social contract. In addition to aWeberianmonopoly over
violence, a functioning state must be able to enforce laws, secure property rights and
enforce contracts, as well as possess the fiscal capacity to raise revenues and provide
public goods. If it does not, a contradiction emerges between the de jure and de facto
functions of the state, which Ghani and Lockhart (2008) label the sovereignty gap. A
modern state must also be able to provide a wider range of public goods (health and
education for example), in addition to a capacity to regulate and manage markets. The
list grows longer with economic progress – more affluent nations tend to have bigger
governments (measured by the share of government consumption in national income),
as well as greater capacity to tax (see data in World Bank 2010). Economic decline
in failing states severely undermines the state’s fiscal capacity, something that makes
the state heavily development assistance dependent, which further diminishes state
capacity. Furthermore, a ‘failing’ state’s ability to guarantee personal security, prop-
erty rights and laws is often limited, leading to the privatisation of violence between
predatory and defensive elements within society. All these factors combine to produce
a degenerating social contract, where individuals rely on kinship based groups and
local warlords for security and the provision public goods, heightening civil war risk
as society descends towards an anarchical, Hobbesian state of nature.
3.2.3 Globalisation and conflict
In developing countries deemed to be successes in terms of achieving economic growth
and their participation in the globalised economy, economic progress can bring about
its own conflictive tendencies even when the state is not fundamentally threatened by
outright civil war. Some of these conflicts take the form of highly localised revolts in
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small pockets of the nation state, and may even escape serious international scrutiny,
as the country as a whole is deemed to be making progress. Countries that are growth
or human development successes on aggregate may still contain regions where extreme
disadvantages and deprivation persist.
Some of the world’s economic success stories, in terms of growth, are highly glob-
alised in terms of their participation in international trade and financial flows. These
countries, mainly in East Asia (and also India), have done well, but the cost has been
greater inequality, particularly the widening gap between skilled and unskilled workers
(Mamoon and Murshed 2008), and the increased marginalisation of informal sector
workers and landless labourers. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) theory of
trade informs us that after an expansion of trade, the factors of production engaged
more intensively in the exportable sector will witness a rise in their remuneration. This
is because the exportable sectors of the economy expand after increased international
trade, while the import-competing sectors contract. If there are factors of production,
say certain types of workers, specific to the contracting sectors, many of these indi-
viduals will become part of the unemployed unless they can re-equip themselves into
newer occupations. It is immediately apparent that globalisation produces winners and
losers, and in many instances the losers of increased trade or globalisation demand pro-
tection. The absence of these counteracting policies can encourage revolt, including
violent protest that undermines development, even if it is not a serious challenge to
the state of the type that produces what is commonly understood to be state ‘failure’.
For example, the commercial extraction of forestry and mineral resources in India,
along with the historical marginalisation of certain ethnicities, have fuelled Maoist
insurgencies in that country.
Rodrik (1998) pointed out that more open economies generally tend to have bigger
governments. The larger size of government relative to national income is predicated
on the need for the state to provide a form of insurance or social safety net against
the temporary adverse economic shocks that tend to strike these more open economies
with greater frequency, some of which are purely external to the country. For example,
the rise in global food and essential fuel prices sparked off revolts in many parts of the
world, especially in food and fuel importing developing countries. Shifts in food and
fuel prices may also have even been partially responsible for the Arab Spring protests
in 2011. By contrast, the Chinese government’s fiscal boost following the growth slow-
down in the wake of the 2008 recessionmay have staved off social unrest. Similarly, the
achievement of macroeconomic stability may produce conflict. For example, interna-
tional financial markets require the smooth servicing of a country’s external debt, but
debt servicing may require belt tightening in terms of competitive devaluation (which
raises the cost of imported food and fuel), as well as government spending cuts. This
can lead to mass protest and riots. There is thus a trade-off between macroeconomic
and political stability (Boyce 2007).
3.2.4 Prosperity and violence
More generally, historical accounts suggest that violence and increasing prosperity
initially go hand in hand in the early stages of development, but decline thereafter (Bates
2001). Traditional societies may have rules and norms that manage violent behaviour,
even making peaceful dispute settlement self-enforcing. An increase in prosperity may
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encourage predatory behaviour in the form of private violence by the less fortunate,
or group violence if the collective action problem is resolved. Once growth progresses
further, violence must decline to sustain the security of investment, and the state has
to perform regulatory and security provisioning functions. Increasing violence may
be symptomatic of the return of privatised social violence, precipitated by frustration
spawned by greater awareness in the midst of the lack of commensurate individual
(rather than national) progress. Gurr’s (1970) notion of relative deprivation argues
that when people perceive that they have less than their just deserts, they will revolt.
This is more likely to occur when the general or average level of prosperity is increasing,
but some groups are left behind, as is often the case following globalisation led growth.
Another issue that may produce violence in developing countries, but has received
scant attention, is the growing inequality between the richer and poorer nations of
the world. Milanovic (2011) demonstrates that the growth effort required for poor
countries to catch up, including that for fast growing emerging economies like India,
is much greater than expected. Secondly, individual positions in a global income dis-
tribution are much more determined by domicile (the country where you work) rather
than socioeconomic class or occupation. For example, the income inequality between
two similarly qualified doctors working in Britain and Zimbabwe may be greater than
the measured inequalities that exist within a single nation state. In an era of widespread
informational dissemination aboutmore affluent life styles, disparities between nations
may encourage people disaffected by this global inequality of opportunity to revolt
against their government’s failure to deliver a higher and fairer standard of living. The
draconian restrictions on international migration do not help to resolve these tensions.
3.3 NATURAL RESOURCE ENDOWMENTS AND CIVIL WAR
The scarcity of resources such as land or water for agriculture or pastoralism may
produce conflict. During the last decade, however, the fact that economic dependence
on primary goods exports enhances conflict risk became an oft-cited finding in the
rational choice literature in conflict studies. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) thus argue
that the abundance of natural resource rents is said to lead to the greed motivation
for conflict, the idea being that it is easier to purloin profits or rents associated with
the production of natural resource based commodities. This result has been subjected
to a great deal of scrutiny, and as a consequence has not emerged unscathed. The fact
that this simple assertion, based on a non-robust statistical association, needs to be
nuanced is now widely accepted; see Murshed, 2010, chapter 3 for a detailed review.
A major concern with the Collier and Hoeffler (2004) econometric work was that
it conflated all primary goods exports (the independent variable was primary goods
exports as a share of national income) with key lootable or obstructable resources, and
excluded illegal substances. To be a source of conflict a natural resource based product
needs to be contestable (Ross 2003); prime examples of these are oil, gas, alluvial
diamonds and narcotics bases (coca and poppy). Furthermore, there is a measurement
issue: do we take into account the total stock of resources in our measurement of
conflict risk rather than flows (indicated by production or exports). Additionally, when
we differentiate between on-shore and off-shore oil, alluvial and deep mine diamonds,
the conflict risks are greater with both on-shore oil and alluvial diamonds (both are
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more obstructable or lootable). Finally, there are issues with sample size and averaging,
rendering the econometric findings of Collier and Hoeffler non-robust to variations in
coverage.
The availability of lootable and obstructable resource rents may be a better expla-
nation for the longer duration of civil war rather than its actual onset. Natural resource
rents can, in and of themselves, also become a source of grievance leading to war and
insurgency if local populations feel that they are not getting their fair share of the
proceeds of resource rents. Such is the case in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. It can
also cause secessionist tendencies among relatively rich regions that no longer want to
share their wealth with their fellow countrymen, as in the case of Aceh in Indonesia.
The greed motivation for conflict discussed thus far is by no means the only expla-
nation. Aptly titled, the resource curse provides another explanation for conflict. The
resource curse argues that the presence of substantial natural resource rents retards
development through political economy channels. This has a bearing on resource rents
as a potential driver of civil war, as civil war is one (violent) form of competition over
the right to control resource rents. In a nutshell, the negative effects of resource rents
from a political economy perspective arise when it leads to rent seeking and corruption,
both of which have a destructive effect on normal productive investment and hence
growth. The key mechanism in the middle which transforms resource wealth and rents
to a problematic political economy is institutional quality. Kleptocratic motivations
may also lead to the deliberate undermining of the institutions that sustain the social
contract mentioned above. The important point is that institutional quality is partially
historically determined, but they are equally determined by (or endogenous to) natural
resource abundance or dependence.
A related question is what do we precisely mean by institutions. In the literature
under review here, institutions pertain to the measured quality of governance, and
sometimes to the nature of the political system (democracy, autocracy, anocracy, presi-
dential/primeministerial systems, constraints on the executive). All of these phenomena
are numerically measured in various data sets that code and rank institutional quality.
Mavrotas, Murshed and Torres (2011) demonstrate that both point-source (mainly
mineral and fuels) and a diffuse (agricultural) type natural resource dependence retard
the development of democracy and good governance, which in turn hampers economic
growth. In this connection good governance may be more salient for economic growth
relative to the quality of democracy.
Auty andGelb (2001) argue cogently that an abundance of natural resource wealth
can make the state and society less benevolent and more extractive compared to devel-
opmental states that nurture an internationally competitive manufacturing sector, as in
North-East Asia. An abundance of resource rents, especially oil and gas rents, can also
retard state capacity, especially fiscal capacity. This is because the state is less reliant
on taxes as a source of revenue, depending to some extent on royalties associated with
oil and gas. This may have a negative impact on democratic development (Ross 2001),
as lower levels of taxation imply less accountable government.
Is it natural resource abundance or dependence which is at issue here? A country
may be abundant in natural resources, but may not depend as much on these if it
has a diversified economy, compared to undiversified resource dependent economies
(referred to as the staple trap by Auty and Gelb, 2001). For example, the United
States is abundant in many types of natural resources, but is less dependent on them
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compared to say, Nigeria. The former country mainly exports software based prod-
ucts and services within a global value chain, whereas the latter mainly relies on oil
exports. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) reject previous arguments that regard natu-
ral resource wealth or dependence as the principal culprit for civil war. They speculate
that resource dependence (a reliance on primary goods exports rather than simply
having a lot of natural resources) may be a manifestation of the failure to grow and
diversify as a consequence of conflict, but it does not contribute directly to conflict.
Both the simple minded greed theories based on purely criminal motivations and
naive institutional fundamentalism in relation to natural resource rents and conflict
risk need a great deal of nuancing to the individual case under scrutiny, so that the
mechanisms that contribute to natural resource rents becoming conflict risk enhancing
are properly understood. Among the many factors to be considered are the type of
natural resource, measurements of their abundance and the economy’s dependence on
them, variation in the quality of political institutions, the incentives of rulers and the
ruling class, andwhether rulers deliberately undermine existing institutions to facilitate
their kleptocratic ends.
An important dimension missing from the literature on natural resources and con-
flict is the individual’s motivation to participate or refrain from joining rebellion or
violent contests over resource rents. This problem is usually brushed under the carpet,
even by those constructing theoretical (mathematical) models of resource driven con-
flict, by stating that the conflict entrepreneur must satisfy the participation constraints
of his soldiers (usually by allowing them to loot). Indeed, many studies have indi-
cated that participation in violence is motivated by the lack of alternative employment
opportunities and the lack of human capital (education) with which to make a living.
In addition to these extrinsic or pecuniary motivations, individuals are also driven by
intrinsic motivations, particularly group grievances. As previously indicated, group
identity may be salient to revolt and rebellion. An individual’s utility may be related to
his group identity, specifically the relative position of the group he identifies himself
with in the social pecking order; see Akerlof and Kranton (2000). An individual may
derive utility from certain normative forms of behaviour appropriate to his identity
but considered deviant by other groups, and may even face sanctions from like-minded
groupmembers if he/she deviates from them. Memories of historical injustices can play
an important part in forming the group identity. This type of behavioural paradigm
may be related to solving the collective action problems alluded to earlier, without
which organised large-scale violence is impossible.
3.4 LOCALISED CONFLICT
In conflict studies at present there is a need to go beyond the results that emerge from
‘averaging’ across theworld’s conflicts typical of cross-national studies, where the cases
are extremely heterogeneous because conflicts in different parts of theworld are lumped
together in a single cross-country econometric exercise, to the analysis of conflict at the
more homogenous sub-regional and sub-national levels. The study of local conflicts is
very much within the mode of the case study approach. The heterogeneous effects of
conflict may extend to different areas of the same country, including rural and urban
areas. Therefore, more studies of the drivers and consequences of conflict at a more
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local level within nation states are required. Average results that are determined from
a cross-section of countries in various parts of the world, combining Latin America,
Africa and Asia, may disguise what is salient to an individual conflict in a region
within a country. It is also often misleading, leading to one-size-fits-all types of policy
prescriptions that can backfire. For example, environmental conflict between different
groups over land, access to water and other natural resource based production inputs
yield different results when studied locally or in a large N-country cross-sectional
analysis. Environmental factors as a source of conflict are found more significant in
local case studies, whereas its importance diminisheswhen examined through the prism
of a cross-country analysis. Moreover, in many large developing countries, systematic
internal conflict is highly localised and confined to a few small geographical regions.
These do not necessarily seriously undermine the central authority of the state, but
continue to retard human development in various pockets, even when the nation as a
whole is making progress. The various Maoist insurgencies in India are a case in point.
A variety ofmethodologies can be employed to study local conflicts. One such tech-
nique is based on the analysis of household surveys. These are standard nowadays,
and among other things are used to gauge information on household consumption,
living standards and other socio-economic information, including questions about
identity. They are particularly useful in post-conflict settings in order to garner infor-
mation on household coping strategies, livelihood investment decisions, as well as the
salience of group identity based grievances in provoking future conflict. There have
been calls for a more microeconomic approach to the study of conflict (for example,
Verwimp, Justino and Brück 2009), and this essentially implies studying conflict in
particular localities. Another technique, used in geography, involves GIS mapping of
conflict flashpoints and the exact location of contested natural resource endowments.
For example, Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) find that group differences
in per-capita income along with political exclusion help to explain conflict.
Local level household surveys permit the gathering of information on aspects of
cognitive psychology involving trauma and some of the tenets of behavioural eco-
nomics in situations where there has been violence and conflict. This is important,
because household preferences may not be exogenous but endogenous to previous
experiences, including the trauma of conflict. For rural households and self-employed
informal sector workers, consumption and production decisions are inseparable
because production and consumption are closely related. Therefore, these households
are used to risky decisions and outlays. The presence of armed conflict can add new
dimensions into these risks and uncertainties, depending on the duration and inten-
sity of the conflict, as well as perceptions about conflict re-emerging if it has stopped.
Here prospect theory rather than expected utility may be more relevant following the
traumas of war (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979). Observed behaviour suggests that an
uncertain prospect is often judged by the overall prospect of loss or gain rather than its
strict pecuniary expected value; risk taking (rather than risk aversion) may be a more
common psychological response from positions of loss.
Prospect theory represents a departure from expected utility in that it is a two-
stage process, and risky ventures are weighted not just by (subjective) probability of
the different risky states, but by a more complicated ‘decision weighting’ process. The
first stage of the decision involves an editing phase where a reference point is chosen to
evaluate the likely effect of the actual risky investment and framed in terms of specific
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aspects of the highly valued prospect or outcome by the decision maker. In the second
stage of evaluation, when the household decides on its type of investments, it may
take more risks if the risky project has a high enough decision weight in comparison
to the less risky alternative. Decision weighting is related to the probability of an
uncertain project bearing fruition, but it also includes the subjective desirability of
the outcome, a property that alters less readily in the mind than the more objective
probability of success. The point being that taking on more risks is understandable
if there is a substantial chance that such investments will lead to the recuperation
of particular erstwhile losses. Consequently, a strong desire to retrieve a valued past
state as a primary response to trauma and loss may occasionally lead to increased
risk taking after experiences of violence. Clearly, there will be some heterogeneity
in individual responses to violence; not all traumatised individuals will become risk
takers. Subjective perceptions regarding violence are endogenous to the lingering effect
of actual past experiences. In decision-making involving the future, these perceptions
may impact more on current individual preferences and choice. Individual households
may not just be passively coping with the events around them, but can actively react
to these events in order to re-shape their future.
The points enumerated thus far in this section pertain to individuals and house-
holds. For the study of local conflict, however, the knowledge of local conditions
also matters, and these will differ from national level averages and institutions. Local
institutions that are of importance are not the national quality of governance and demo-
cratic functioning, but instead local politics and social capital, especially the extent
of bridging social capital (if any) between antagonists. Furthermore, local economic
conditions are crucial to the conflict, and these include group inequalities, poverty
profiles, and the abundance or scarcity of agricultural inputs (resources). Above all,
what is salient to a local conflict is whether different ethnicities compete over the
same resource, or whether they participate in complementary economic activities. For
example, conflict risk is much greater when different ethnicities are engaged in the
same activity, say agriculture, than when one group are principally farmers and the
other retail traders.
Another point of interest in the analysis of local conflict is decentralised gov-
ernance, particularly fiscal federalism (Murshed 2010). Fiscal federalism devolves
government expenditure decisions and/or revenue raising powers to sub-national enti-
ties. The revenue aspect may be important, particularly for regions with natural
resources as is the case in Indonesia or Nigeria, because it appeases local discon-
tent about regionally generated revenues being siphoned off to central government.
Other regional governments may be better able to raise local revenues or even conduct
their own borrowing. Decentralisation may also increase the utility of regions able to
make their own decisions about local public expenditure. It is therefore important to
distinguish between the revenue and expenditure side of fiscal decentralisation and its
relation to conflict.
On the expenditure side, a citizen is normally indifferent to which layer of govern-
ment provides public goods, as long as provision is adequate. Citizens may care about
the type of provision in some instances, say about what languages are taught in school,
which might vary over different education authorities. Thus, expenditure priorities are
subject to political processes. Consequently, it may matter which executive authority
(regional or national) or what legislature (regional or national) legislates on spending
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priorities. Related to this is the theory of club goods. As the name suggests, club goods
are excludable and voluntary. Only members can benefit from the club good. As with
a public good, members of a club share, so the rule for the optimal provision for pub-
lic goods also applies. The important point here is that many government services are
closer to the characteristics of club goods as opposed to pure public goods, particularly
at the local level. Furthermore, an outcome closer to the club goods optimum may be
achieved with greater local control over public expenditure. Since this implies volition,
it may be conflict reducing.
Poorly conceived fiscal federalism or the failure to adapt federalist rules to new
and emerging situations (such as natural resource discoveries or debt burdens) can
exacerbate latent conflictual tendencies in federations. In countries where minorities
are geographically dispersed, other forms of functional federalism or power dividing
mechanisms are necessary in addition to fiscal federalism. Fiscal decentralisation might
work better inmiddle income countries with greater revenues to spend on public goods,
and in countries where resource rich regions demand financial autonomy. Indeed,
Tranchant (2008) empirically demonstrates that fiscal federalism is more successful
at reducing conflict risk in countries with superior institutions using the international
country risk guide (ICRG) data, implying that better institutional quality means the
country has superior governance and more durable political institutions. In particular,
nations with malfunctioning institutions often have weak central governments, which
encourages violent challenges to it, as well as scenarios in which fiscal decentralisation
fails to mollify potential rebels.
3.5 SECTARIAN AND CIVILISATIONAL CONFLICT
Rational choice approaches to conflict mainly focus on the material (economic, polit-
ical) basis for conflict, as well as its material effects on society. There is relatively
less on intrinsic and identity-based motivations for conflict – a group cause based on
identity that individuals identify with and can fight for. One reason for this is that
rational choice approaches often ignore history, concentrating on more immediate cir-
cumstances. Secondly, there is relatively less literature originating from the economics
discipline on two forms of low intensity violence: civilisational or cultural conflict and
sectarian violence. This is perhaps because neither truly undermines the existence of the
state. In sectarian conflict the focus should be on individual choices to join or refrain
from violence, rather than collective or group choices, as these modes of sectarian
conflict are relatively less pre-meditated.
Sectarian violence between religious groups characterises several developing coun-
tries: Hindu-Muslim violence in India, and Christian-Muslim violence in Indonesia
and Nigeria. These outbreaks are highly localised – confined to certain regions of large
countries – and do not fundamentally undermine the state. The state itself is not a tar-
get of the violence, unlike in the case of civil war; only localised state functionaries are
found to be actors in this form of violence. India has a longer history than either Nige-
ria or Indonesia in this regard. Brass (2003) points out that Hindu-Muslim sectarian
violence, known as communal rioting in India, is not as spontaneous as we are led to
believe, but is very much a part of the political process in India – particularly during the
rise of Hindu fundamental parties in the post-Nehru era. He also contends that, since
48 Conflicts over natural resources in the global south – Conceptual approaches
Muslims are a regular target of such attacks, the attacks should be more appropriately
termed as pogroms rather than spontaneous rioting. The easing of sectarian conflict
in developing countries requires poverty reduction and the stemming of the inequali-
ties produced by economic globalisation. Declining poverty raises the attractiveness of
peaceful income, rather than the earnings related to loot and violence. The inequality
produced by globalisation produces richer sectarian individuals who fund communal
causes, leaving it to their poorer brethren to enact the violence. Hence, social safety
nets and the public provision of health and education that combat poverty and lower
inequality are essential. Localised institutional functioning also needs addressing. This
includes the often virulently sectarian outlook of local governments, such as the gov-
ernment of the Indian state of Gujarat. Furthermore, getting to know the “other’’ by
way of increasing the bridging social capital between communities is also important
in building peace, as are the advantages of peaceful income to individuals.
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
In the last decade, our understanding of the processes underlying mass violent inter-
nal conflict has progressed to incorporate a greater variety of economic, political and
social factors, as well as institutions of conflict management. Methodological differ-
ences remain, but analysts of conflict have achieved a degree of consensus that violent
internal conflict is mainly brought about by relative deprivation and/or the compe-
tition over resources. These tendencies, however, can either be mitigated by good
institutional structures of governance or exacerbated by malfunctioning and degen-
erating institutions (the social contract). Indeed, one of the more robust statistical
findings regarding conflict risk is that low per-capita income increases the likelihood
of war. This is because lower per-capita income implies greater poverty, along with a
greater probability of institutional malfunctioning.
A well functioning social contract manages potential conflict and discourages vio-
lent challenges to the state by non-state actors. There are also well known quantitative
studies that cover all countries in the world and regard the determinants of internal
conflict. The general propositions that emerge are informative, stressing on the one
hand the presence of opportunity and feasibility in forming rebel movements, as well as
the failure of state capacity to restrain these tendencies. On the other hand, it has long
been recognised that deprivation produces rebellion. This relates to the differences
between what people have in terms of tangible socio-economic indicators (income,
assets including land, access to common property resources, access to public services,
education and health), and what they think are their just deserts. If they have less, they
may be inclined to rebel. Furthermore, in the absence of corrective policies, this is more
likely to cause conflict in more ethnically fragmented societies. The moot point here
is whether we are more concerned with individual relative deprivation or ethnically
based group relative deprivation as a source of conflict risk.
Yet a variety of lacunae remain in conflict studies. First and foremost is the com-
plex relationship between development and economic progress and conflict risk. Both
severe underdevelopment and rapid economic progress can produce conflict risk. The
former is associated more with the risk of civil war, while the latter usually associ-
ated with mass violent protest and localised rebellion that does not fundamentally
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undermine the position of the state. Attention has to be focused on the distributional
consequences of growth. New sources of tension arise in our globalised world because
of rising food and fuel prices that intensify existing grievances against the state, bur-
dens of servicing international debt, and through the relative deprivation felt because
of the ever-widening gap in living standards between rich and poor countries. Sec-
ondly, we have the non-linear impact of increased democratisation on conflict risk.
Mature democracies are usually more peaceful, but democratic transitions enhance
the chances of violent conflict. This means we have to have a nuanced take on the role
of institutions, eschewing the naïve institutional fundamentalism that pervades the
contemporary mainstream thinking about long-term development. Thirdly, greater
emphasis has to be put on detailed case studies of local conflict. This means a deeper
understanding of local economic conditions and social capital. Household surveys, if
intelligently designed, can also yield deeper psychological insights on how the trauma
of violence affects economic behaviour, as well as gauging the contribution of group
identity and group grievances to any future conflict risk. The role of intrinsic motiva-
tion in joining movements, particularly the part played by an individual’s identification
with the cause of a disadvantaged group that he belongs to, deserves much more than
the scant and passing attention that it has hitherto received in the rational choice lit-
erature on conflict. The study of sectarian (or communal) conflicts in countries such
as India, Indonesia and Nigeria deserves more sophisticated study.
In the ultimate analysis, conflict resolution has ubiquitously required justice, and
not just the justice that is in the interest of the stronger. In this connection a few
words about the new liberal imperialism, which for example favours regime change
by direct action, are in order. Just as in the 19th century, the excuse of civilizing the
backward is being increasingly used to justify direct intervention in developing country
conflicts. Despite the rhetoric, there is a great danger that these actions are much more
in tune with the old imperialist objective of controlling the non-European world to the
advantage of Europe (the presentWest), or at the very least in the spirit of colonialism’s
misplaced ‘white man’s burden’ aim of civilizing the uncivilised; something that has
been historically such a resounding failure.
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